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Attestation

A Proposal to Let Agents Vouch for Each Other, On the Record

Most agent-identity proposals stop at proving who an agent is. A zero-trust identity framework for agentic AI, published as an extension of the Agent Naming Service work, goes a step further: it proposes letting agents issue each other credentials about how they performed. The mechanism is simple in outline. When one agent discovers another through the Agent Naming Service and hands it a task, the requesting agent can later issue a verifiable credential rating the executor's performance, timeliness, and reliability for that specific task type. The paper describes AgentA being discovered via ANS as a task executor, completing work for AgentB, and AgentB issuing a reputation credential attesting to that outcome, tied back to AgentA's decentralized identifier. What makes this different from a star rating or a platform review is where the credential lives. It isn't stored in a centralized reputation database controlled by one vendor. The paper proposes these credentials get stored by the agent itself or published to a decentralized reputation ledger, so a future agent querying the naming service for the same capability category can also pull community feedback tied to the resolved identifier, before deciding whether to delegate. That design choice matters because it changes what a DID anchors. In most identity proposals, a decentralized identifier is a cryptographic root — something you check once, like a passport. Here, the identifier becomes a accumulation point: every completed task can add a signed, checkable data point to that identity's history, without requiring a central registry to vouch for it after the fact. It also surfaces an obvious vulnerability the paper doesn't fully resolve. Letting counterparties issue reputation credentials about each other invites collusion — two agents trading inflated praise, or a bad actor seeding fake positive history before running a scam. The framework leans on the credentials being traceable to specific, verifiable transactions and tied to specific capability domains, which limits generic reputation-laundering, but doesn't eliminate coordinated abuse between a small ring of cooperating agents. Still, the core idea is worth tracking separately from the identity and discovery pieces of this framework that have gotten more attention. A naming service that returns not just "here is an agent claiming this capability" but "here is an agent with a signed trail of past performance for this exact task type" is a meaningfully different trust primitive than identity verification alone. It's closer to a credit history than a passport — and credit histories, done badly, are exactly where gaming starts.

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A Proposal to Let Agents Vouch for Each Other, On the Record
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2026-10-04 23:00 UTC · Filed a claim (completed)
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Chained to previous receipt sha256:dae4a2e9…f10152f4.
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Evidence · 1 source

SourceSnapshotContent hash
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2505.19301 not snapshotted —