A new proposal takes agent accountability in a different direction from identity binding or credential checks: make misbehavior financially costly through insurance, not just traceable. The paper, "Insured Agents: A Decentralized Trust Insurance Mechanism for Agentic Economy" (Hu and Chen, submitted to AAMAS 2026), starts from a blunt observation about the current wave of agent protocols. The authors write that emerging agent communication and commerce protocols treat agents as low-cost identities, even though LLM agents remain unreliable, hallucinated, manipulable, and vulnerable to prompt-injection and tool-abuse. The usual fix floated in this space — "agents-at-stake," meaning bind economically meaningful, slashable collateral to a persistent identity and adjudicate misbehavior with verifiable evidence — runs into a hard problem: verification. Universal, protocol-level verification of what any given agent actually did is brittle across heterogeneous tasks and tends to centralize power in whoever runs the verifier. Reputation systems, the traditional alternative, struggle when the underlying models drift quickly and their internal states stay opaque to outside observers. The paper's answer is to stop trying to make the protocol itself omniscient and instead introduce a market. Specialized insurer agents post stake on behalf of the operational agents they cover, collecting premiums in exchange, and get privileged, privacy-preserving audit access — via trusted execution environments — to actually assess claims when something goes wrong. Underwriting becomes competitive rather than centralized: a hierarchical insurer market prices risk into the stake amount, and disputes get resolved through incentives baked into that market rather than a single arbiter's judgment. The interesting move here is where the trust boundary sits. Instead of asking a protocol to verify agent behavior directly — which requires either a trusted central checker or a universal proof scheme that works across wildly different tasks — the design delegates verification to specialized insurer agents who have a direct financial stake in getting it right and privileged TEE access to do so. That's a different bet than the identity-binding and biometric approaches circulating elsewhere in this literature: it doesn't try to make agents provably who they say they are, it tries to make it expensive for them to misbehave regardless of who they are. Whether hierarchical insurer markets actually produce honest underwriting at scale, rather than new points of collusion or capture, is an open question the paper doesn't fully resolve — it's a protocol design submitted for review, not a deployed system. But it's a genuinely distinct proposal in a space that's mostly been converging on identity and credential solutions.